We examine a duopoly with polluting production where …rms adopt a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to de…ne their objective functions. Our analysis focusses on the bearings of CSR on collusion over an in…nite horizon, sustained by either grim trigger strategies or optimal punishments. Our results suggest that assigning a weight to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect under both full and partial collusion. Conversely, a higher impact of productivity on pollution has an anti-competitive e¤ect under partial collusion, while exerting no e¤ect under full collusion. Under partial collusion, the analysis of the isoquant map of the cartel reveals that complementarity arises between the two weights.
Introduction
A growing interest for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is recently characterising the economic literature. 1 One strand identi…es CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads (Bagnoli and The presence of CSR is viewed by its supporters as a self-regulating tool, as it leads …rms to internalise the environmental e¤ects caused by production. The question we address in this paper is whether the adoption of CSR has an impact on …rms ability to collude. A priori, CSR may have ambiguous welfare implications, since an output restriction driven by a CSR mandate shrinks the external e¤ects but obviously intensi…es collusion, the balance between the negative price e¤ect and the positive environmental e¤ect being unclear.
We model a duopoly supergame where production pollutes the environment, …rms follow rules of Corporate Social Responsibility and compete à la Cournot. We de…ne as CSR a …rm that takes into account not only its profits but also internalises its own share of the externality and is sensitive to consumers'welfare. We examine both full and partial collusion using alter- Our results suggest that, irrespective of the speci…c nature of punishment, to assign a weight to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect both in full and partial collusion. Also, a higher impact of productivity on pollution has a pro-competitive e¤ect in partial collusion, and no e¤ect in full collusion. 2 We complement the analysis of cartel behaviour with a welfare appraisal based on the shape of the isoquant map associated with both types of punishment, …nding out that the weights attached to the externality and consumer surplus are complements over the entire parameter range.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the solution in full collusion. Section 3 analyses full and partial collusion, respectively, with grim trigger strategies. Section 4 examines full and partial collusion with optimal punishments. The welfare implications are illustrated in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We consider a supergame taking place over discrete time t = 0; 1; 2; ::; during which …rms 1 and 2 compete à la Cournot and supply a homogeneous good, whose market demand function is p = a q 1 q 2 ; a being a positive constant parameter measuring the reservation price and q 1 and q 2 being the quantity produced by …rm 1 and 2, respectively. In each period t, production takes place at constant returns to scale with a marginal cost c 2 (0; a), common to both …rms and time-invariant. Hence, the per-period individual …rm's pro…t function is i = (p c)q i ; i 2 f1; 2g : Throughout the supergame, …rms share the same time preferences, measured by the constant discount factor 2 (0; 1). The production of the …nal output entails a negative 2 To the best of our knowledge, there exists two contributions loosely related to our discussion, although neither incorporate CSR. The …rst is Damania (1996) , using a Cournot supergame to show that …rms' pro…tability is enhanced by environmental taxation. The second is Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) , where the pro-competitive e¤ects of a minimum quality standard regulation are illustrated in a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly where …rms collude in prices.
environmental externality E = q 1 + q 2 . For simplicity, we assume that E does not accumulate over time. 3 Consumer surplus is measured by CS = (q 1 + q 2 ) 2 =2. The resulting social welfare function is well as the environment. Thus we need to assume a speci…c CSR objective structure. In this, we borrow from Lambertini and Tampieri (2010): for the environmental concern, we assume that the CSR …rm internalises its own share of pollution. All the other social concerns can be interpreted in our model as part of consumer surplus, hence we assume that the CSR …rm is sensitive to it. Thus the CSR objective function is:
where z 2 [0; 1] denotes the weight that …rm i assigns to consumer surplus, and g 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of environmental awareness of the …rm.
For simplicity, we assume z is common to both …rms. Also, we assume that a > c + g in order to ensure that the Cournot equilibrium quantities are 3 This would turn our setup into a proper dynamic game with a state (the stock of pollution) evolving over time. There exists a large literature in this vein (see, e.g., Bencheckroun and Long, 1998; 2002; and Dockner et al., 2000, ch. 12). 4 See www.mallenbaker.net/csr/de…nition.php.
positive.
Grim trigger strategies
In this section we examine the standard solution of a supergame where deviations from the cartel path are deterred by grim trigger strategies (Friedman, 1971 ), i.e., after any defection …rms revert forever to the Nash equilibrium of the constituent game.
Full collusion
To begin with, we examine the equilibrium in the case of full collusion, that is, we analyse the existence of a collusive subgame perfect equilibrium where the two …rms jointly solve the following problem:
yielding:
A unilateral deviation q along one's own best reply function yields the following outcome:
where the superscripts D and CH stand for "deviating" and "cheated", respectively. Finally, Cournot-Nash non-cooperative behaviour entails the following outputs and payo¤s:
where N stands for "Nash equilibrium". Simple algebra shows that~ D >~ ;
N >~ CH and~ >~ N : Therefore, the constituent game is indeed a prisoner's dilemma.
The condition for the stability of full collusion under grim trigger strate-
that is met by all
By deriving w.r.t. z, we obtain
Hence an increase in the …rms' sensitivity to consumer surplus increases the critical threshold of the discount factor allowing for full collusion. This implies:
Lemma 1 Under full collusion, increasing the weight attached to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ ect.
On the other hand, since @ =@g = 0; internalising the environmental externality has no e¤ect whatsoever on the sustainability of collusion.
Partial collusion
In the case that the discount factor is too high to allow full collusion, …rms may nonetheless activate the highest degree of partial collusion compatible with their intertemporal preferences, rather than revert to Cournot-Nash competition. I.e., …rms have to identify the lowest collusive quantity q C ;
given a generic discount factor < .
Setting q 1 = q 2 = q C ; we may write the symmetric collusive payo¤ accruing to each …rm as
The unilateral deviation along the best reply function yields:
where the meaning of superscripts is intuitive. The intensity of partial collusion is measured by the minimum level of q C satisfying the inequality:
that gives:
with (a c g)
Accordingly, for any 2 (0; ) ; the most intense level of collusion takes place at
with subscript N denoting the Nash reversion. We are now in a position to analyse the relationship between b q C N and both the sensitivity to consumer surplus, z, and the impact of productivity on pollution, g. The partial derivative of b q C N w.r.t. z yields:
To evaluate its sign, note …rst that 2z
Moreover, the denominator of the above fraction is positive. Hence,
with < 0 and + > 1 always. This proves that @ b q C N =@z > 0 over the entire admissible region of parameters f ; zg :
Lemma 2 Under partial collusion, increasing the weight attached to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ ect.
We turn now to the analysis of the impact of g on collusion. The partial derivative of b q C N w.r.t. g yields:
Since the denominator is surely negative, any z 2 ((5 p 5)=4; 1) su¢ ces to
0 for all ? (3 2z) 2 = 4z 2 10z + 5 : However,
Consequently, @ b q C N =@g < 0 over the entire admissible region of parameters f ; zg :
Lemma 3 Under partial collusion, internalising the environmental externality has an anti-competitive e¤ ect.
The intuition is clear. Both taking into account the environmental externality and colluding leads to a reduction of the output produced.
Optimal punishments
In this section we analyse Abreu's (1986, 1988) one-shot optimal punishments in the CSR duopoly, both for full and partial collusion. The stability of collusion and the implementability of the penal code require, respectively (see Abreu, 1986 , Lemma 17, p. 204):
where~ OP denotes each …rm's stage payo¤ when both …rms play the optimal punishment q OP , i.e.:
whilst~ DOP is the payo¤ from a one-shot best response against q OP , i.e.:
A third constraint must be taken into account, i.e., the so-called security level, stating that the discounted continuation payo¤ from the punishment period onwards must be non-negative in order for …rms not to quit the
Full collusion
We start from the case with full collusion. By solving the system (24-25),
we obtain:
The denominator of (29) is positive for all z 2 [0; 1], so that q OP > 0 for all
Now we have to check whether (28) is satis…ed. Given q i = q OP , = OP ; and for all z 2 [0; 5=6), each …rm's discounted pro…t ‡ow from the punishment period onwards is: We can now control how the sensitivity of consumer surplus a¤ects collusion. By deriving OP w.r.t. z, we obtain
Therefore, even with optimal punishment, an increase in the sensitivity to consumer surplus increases the minimum discount factor allowing for full collusion.
For all z 2 [5=6; 1) we have q OP = 0, so that we obtain two values of OP from (24-25), i.e.:
Collusion is feasible for all > max
OP 2
: Simple algebra shows that
for all z > 5=6; so that collusion is feasible for all > OP 1 . Also within the range z 2 (5=6; 7=8) ; we have < 1. For all z 2 (7=8; 1), since 1 collusion is impossible. Hence we can say that: 5 Lemma 4 Under optimal punishment and full collusion, any positive weight attached to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ ect.
Partial collusion
We now turn to the case of partial collusion. We denote as b q C OP the quantity at which the most intense level of collusion takes place for any 2 0;
OP .
By solving (24-25) w.r.t. b q C OP and q OP , we obtain:
We control for the nonnegativity of b q C OP and q OP : Starting from b q C OP , since the denominator is surely positive, any z 2 [1=2; 1] gives 4 2z 2 5z + 2 < 0 and thus su¢ ces to yield b q C OP > 0: Otherwise, for all z 2 [0; 1=2) ; we have b q C OP ? 0 for all 7 (3 2z) 2 =4 2z 2 5z + 2 : However,
Consequently, b q C OP > 0 over the entire admissible region of parameters f ; zg :
Turning
We can now examine whether the continuation payo¤ from the punishment onwards satis…es the security level constraint. For q OP > 0; each …rm discounted pro…t is:
Being both (a c g) 2 and the denominator positive, we focus our attention on:
which is quadratic in . It can be easily shown (although we omit details for brevity) that = 0 has no real roots for any z 2 [0; 1] : Therefore, (37) is positive, and the security level condition is slack. The same of course holds in the case in which q OP = 0:
We are now in a position to determine whether z and g have a pro or anti-competitive e¤ect. The partial derivative of q OC w.r.t. z yields:
To evaluate its sign, note …rst that 2 (a c g), (3 2z) 2 and the denominator of the above fraction are positive, while 2 4z 2 8z + 3 is concave in z; with 4z 2 8z + 3 = 0 at z = 2 p 7 =2 with z < 0 and z + > 1
always. This proves that @ b q OC =@z > 0 over the entire admissible region of parameters f ; zg ; implying:
Lemma 5 Under partial collusion and optimal punishment, increasing the weight attached to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ ect.
The impact of g on collusion remains to be analysed. The partial derivative of b q C OP w.r.t. g yields:
Since the denominator is surely positive, any z > 1=2 su¢ ces to yield
2 =4 2z 2 5z + 2 : However,
Consequently, @ b q C OP =@g < 0 over the entire admissible region of parameters f ; zg ; therefore an increase in g lowers the maximum quantity allowing for a partial collusion, implying:
Lemma 6 With partial collusion and optimal punishment, to internalise the environmental externality has an anti-competitive e¤ ect on the market.
Lemma 5 and 6 show that, with optimal penal code, the e¤ect of z and g on competition are consistent to their e¤ect with grim trigger strategies.
Welfare appraisal
The bottom line of the foregoing analysis is that the weights g and z attached to the environmental externality and consumer surplus have opposite e¤ects on industry output under partial collusion. This, in turn, has to be assessed in combination with the fact that any increase (resp., decrease) in the output level causes a decrease (resp., increase) in pro…ts and the externality, and an increase (resp., decrease) in consumer surplus. Hence, it is interesting to construct a measure telling how these two parameters should be combined so as to deliver a constant welfare level.
To this purpose, we write the total di¤erential of the individual collusive output b q C J ; J = N; OP; w.r.t. g and z :
db q
and impose db q C J = 0 to obtain the marginal rate of substitution between z and g :
always, as @ b q C J =@g and @ b q C J =@z have opposite sign irrespective of the type of punishment being used. Accordingly, g and z are complements, i.e., any increase in either one must go along with an increase in the other in order for the output to remain constant. In such a case, obviously, also the resulting welfare level remains constant at
Finally, observe that the slope of the associated isoquant is
again irrespective of the nature of punishment (the detailed proof of this result is in the appendix). This means that any increase in g must be accompanied by a more than proportional increase in z. This is seemingly due to the linear form of the externality function and the quadratic form of consumer surplus.
Concluding remarks
We have examined a duopoly with negative environmental externalities in which …rms incorporate CSR into their objective functions, to investigate the e¤ects of CSR on the stability/intensity of collusion. To do so, we have modelled a supergame alternatively allowing for both full or partial col-lusion, the deterrence being based either on grim trigger strategies or on optimal punishments. Our results suggest that, irrespective of the structure of the punishment phase, assigning a weight to consumer surplus has a pro- 
Take the numerator …rst:
always, while:
2z (6 5 ) 9 + 5 4z
over the admissible parameter range, because the roots the above expression are:
which are imaginary for 2 (0; 4=5) and larger than one for 2 (4=5; 1) :
As to the denominator, observe that the coe¢ cient of 2 is always positive, and then solve 
both outside the unit interval. This proves that the isoquant is convex w.r.t.
g when the in…nite Nash reversion is used to stabilise the cartel.
We turn now to optimal punishments. The partial derivative of
w.r.t. g is: 
but the RHS is always higher than one. Therefore the isoquant is convex w.r.t. g also when optimal punishments are adopted.
